Habilitation resolution written 12.02.1925

In Lviv, 12 February 1925.
No. 121.
Subject: The habilitation of Dr Roman INGARDEN in philosophy.

To

THE MINISTRY OF

RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

in

Warsaw.

V        The Council of the Department of Philosophy of the Jan Kazimierz University unanimously resolved at its meeting of 27 June 1924 to grant Roman Witold Ingarden, Doctor of Philosophy, the right to lecture (venia legendi) in the field of philosophy and hereby submits its resolution to the Ministry for approval.

V        Dr Roman Witold Ingarden, of the Roman Catholic religion and Polish nationality, was born in Cracow on 5 February 1893; his father is Roman, President of the General Directorate for river regulation at the Ministry of Public Works; his mother is Witosława née Radwańska. He passed his matura [comprehensive secondary school] examination in 1911 at the State Middle School no. 3 in Lviv, following which he studied philosophy, mathematics, and physics at the University of Lviv for one semester; in the spring of 1912 he transferred to the University of Göttingen, continuing his studies with Professors Husserl, Müller, Maier, Reinach, Nelson, Hilbert, Landau, Cara-Theodory, Toeplitz, Sanden, Voigt, and Cohn. After five semesters spent in Göttingen, he transferred in the autumn of 1914 to the University of Vienna, but returned after one semester, in spring 1915, to Göttingen, whence he followed Professor Husserl, who had been appointed to Freiburg in Baden, and completed his university studies there, earning, on the basis of the dissertation Intuition und Intellekt bei H.[enri] Bergson. Darstellung und Versuch einer Kritik, a doctorate in philosophy in 1918, nostrified by a resolution of the Council of the Department of Philosophy of Jan Kazimierz University of 2 May 1923, approved by ordinance of the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Education of 22 June 1923, no. 5386-IV/23. Since autumn of 1918, Dr Ingarden has been fulfilling the duties of a middle-school teacher, first in 1918/19 in Lublin, then in 1919/20 and 1920/21 in Warsaw, and since autumn 1921 in Toruń.

V        Dr Ingarden’s achievements to date include, apart from his habilitation thesis, which will be discussed separately, a number of reviews, articles, and dissertations. Namely, Dr Ingarden reported on Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen [German: Logical Investigations] in Philosophical Review in 1915; he reviewed Volume III of the journal Yearbook of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in Philosophical Movement in 1920; A. Reinach’s Gesammelte Schriften [German: Collected Writings] in that journal; and Chwistek’s book entitled Wielość rzeczywistości [The Plurality of Realities], extensively in Philosophical Review in 1922 and more briefly in Philosophical Movement in 1923. The review of the book by Dr Chwistek is combined with a polemical article, placed in Philosophical Review in 1923 as a reply to the response of the book’s author; also polemical in nature are an article placed in Philosophical Movement in 1919, ‘O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym’ [On clear and unclear philosophical style] and an item published in Philosophical Review in 1923 entitled ‘W sprawie istoty doświadczenia wewnętrznego’ [On the issue of the existence of internal experience]. The list of printed reviews as of the moment of filing the application for admission to habilitation ends with a report on J. Marcinowska’s book entitled Wartości twórcze myśli religijnej polskiej [Creative values of Polish religious thought] (Warsaw Review, 1923) and a critical dissection of a number of issues, collected in a commemorative book published in honour of Professor K. Twardowski (ibidem 1924).

V        To date, Dr Ingarden has published five of his own dissertations:

V        The doctoral dissertation cited above, entitled Intuition und Intellekt bei H.[enri] Bergson. Darstellung und Versuch einer Kritik [German: Intuition and intellect according to Henri Bergson: A representation and attempt at a critique] (written in 1916/17 and published in 1921 in Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume V, as well as in an offprint) is devoted first and foremost to the systematic presentation of the Bergsonian theory of cognition, in which the problem of intuition plays the role of the central issue. This presentation is divided into three parts, of which the first is a presentation of the issues, deriving from the description and contrast of two different appearances of experiences of consciousness, static and dynamic, which leads to discovery of the existence of cognition of consciousness free of schemata of homogeneous space and time. The nature of this cognition – intuition – constitutes the central issue, whose various aspects and roles in Bergson’s system is discussed in this part. The second part is devoted to the Bergsonian theory of intellect, distinguishing three different ways of considering the intellect: psychological, evolutionary, and metaphysical. The outcome of this part is the development of intellectual schemata by means of which we apprehend reality via intellectual cognition. These schemata, which are alien to both the reality that we cram into them and disinterested cognition, derive from the application of the cognition of reality and should be eliminated in the presence of absolute cognition. The third part discusses intuition as absolute cognition of reality – cognition free of practical considerations and thus of intellectual schemata. Presented separately in this part as well are purely psychological and evolutionary views of intuition. The part ends with the presentation of Bergson’s theory by means of presentation of the method he postulated as a result of his position. – In addition, the dissertation contains preliminary critical considerations, limited to immanent criticism, and attempting to show above all the fallacy of the Bergsonian position on categories, which Bergson identifies with his intellectual schemata, as well as on the issue of the existence of the object. Further critical deliberations show that Bergson’s theory of intellect contains a petitio principii [Latin: (example of) begging the question]. In the course of these deliberations, the conditions that the theory of cognition must meet if it is to answer fundamental issues without the commission of major errors are also discussed.

V        Dążenia fenomenologów [The aspirations of the phenomenologists] is a dissertation published in Philosophical Review (1920) which discusses, in an accessible but independent manner, the basic trends of phenomenology of Husserl and his disciples. Because phenomenology emerged primarily as a reaction against the psychologism of associative empirical psychology, the first chapter of the dissertation is devoted to a discussion of the tendencies of associative psychology and its genetic methods of procedure against the background of natural cognition. This chapter also defines what psychologism consists of, both in logic and in other fields, and attempts to find its source. Chapter 2 compares genetic issues with the phenomenologists’ aspiration to obtain, wherever possible, direct cognition of visual data and descriptions thereof. It discusses the role of concepts – as non-visual conjectures – in both the acquisition of direct knowledge and presentation of the results already obtained thereby. Chapter 3 distinguishes between direct experience, in the sense of direct cognition of real objects and facts, and direct a priori cognition, and discusses the relationship between both modes of cognition. Finally, Chapter 4 outlines Husserl’s tendencies within the so-called phenomenological theory of cognition and especially the issue of immanent cognition of the experiences of pure consciousness.

The dissertation Über die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie, ein Beitrag zur Prinzipienfrage der Erkenntnistheorie [German: On the danger of a petitio principii {Latin: begging the question} in cognition theory] (Yearbook of Philosophy and Phenomenonological Research, vol. 1921), while constituting a whole in and of itself, is the first chapter of a more extensive dissertation, as yet still in manuscript. The task of the first chapter is to demonstrate that it is possible to avoid, in the theory of cognition, a petitio principii [Latin: begging the question] or regresum in infinitum [Latin: infinite regression]. The nucleus of the objection directed against the possibility of a theory of cognition is the assertion that any general knowledge of cognition must either blindly assume the objectivity of the cognition that we actually employ, and thus also the idea of cognition and its objectivity in general, or subordinate the cognition that we actually employ to a new cognition which would have to be known in turn, and so on ad infinitum [Latin: to infinity]. This would be true only if the assumption that each act of cognition can be known only in XXX (another) act of cognition were correct. The dissertation tries to demonstrate that this assumption is false and that there is a particular manner of experiencing cognitive acts, in which we come to know acts simply through experiencing them. This particular manner of experiencing acts of consciousness, which the author calls intuition, is possible only thanks to the essence of the acts of consciousness, an essence that distinguishes consciousness from all other entities. (Some of the ideas of this dissertation, included in its heretofore unpublished parts, were presented by the author at a meeting of the metaphysical-epistemological section of the First Polish Philosophical Congress in Lviv in 1923 in a paper entitled ‘Czy i jak można wykazać obiektywność spostrzeżenia zewnętrznego’ [Whether and how the objectivity of external observation can be demonstrated].)

V        An article entitled ‘Max Scheler’ (Warsaw Review, 1922) offers a spiritual portrait of Scheler against the background of his era and presents the role that Scheler played during the war in Germany. It particularly emphasises XXX background of fundamental aspirations in ethics and the philosophy of culture, Scheler’s opposition to modern culture, and his turn in the direction of the Middle Ages and Catholicism.

V        A dissertation entitled Spór o istotą filozofji [The controversy over the essence of philosophy] (Warsaw Review, 1922) opposes both the popular view of philosophy, according to which all scientifically justified views on the world and life are considered ‘philosophical’, and the tendency to show that there is no such thing as philosophy as a uniform science, and to invoke the diversity and divergence of actually existing ‘philosophical’ theories. An analogous diversity is found in mathematics, and yet we do not dispute the view that all mathematics creates a finite and uniform whole, because of the kinship of studied objects and unfavourable dependencies between particular mathematical theories. Similar kinships and dependencies can be demonstrated between the various branches of philosophy. The divergence between factually existing philosophical views cannot serve as an argument against the existence of philosophy, because in general the existence of certain facts or others, historically conditioned, cannot influence XXX as to the existence of this or that science as a unified system of discovered truths. The existence of such a system is determined by the existence or non-existence of a corresponding uniform and discrete field of objects or states. This dissertation does not attempt to demonstrate the existence of such a field (as far as philosophy is concerned), but points out XXX briefly that the field of the objects of philosophical research belongs XXX in the field of ideal beings.

V        Dr Ingarden’s habilitation dissertation bears the title O pytaniach essencjonalnych [Essential questions] and occupies 176 typed folio pages. An extensive summary of this work was presented by Prof. Dr K. Twardowski to the Scientific Society in Lviv at a meeting of the Department of History and Philosophy on 13 May 1924; this summary is enclosed.

V        Like all of Dr Ingarden’s previous dissertations, his habilitation thesis is an expression of the philosophical direction initiated at the beginning of the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl, once a student of Franciszek Brentano, under the name of the phenomenological school. In the spirit of this school, based on its fundamental views and observing its methods, Dr Ingarden undertook in his habilitation thesis to elaborate a complex of issues which had not yet occupied their proper place in the phenomenological studies of Husserl and his school, although they are closely linked to the notion of ‘entities’ which play such a prominent role in these studies. The idea to conduct an analysis of essential questions, i.e. questions directed to the ‘essence’ must also be called very fortunate, not only from a phenomenological standpoint. Two types of questions come into play here: firstly, questions about form (‘what is this?’) where ‘this’ indicates the unit object and the answer, in the form ‘this is P’, includes in its verdict the general concept; secondly, questions about the form ‘what is P?’ where the answer provides us with information about either the most important or all of the elements of the ‘essence’ of the object in question. It is these questions, taken together, that form the essential question. This is the main thesis of the habilitation dissertation. The Author’s deliberations revolve around the preparation, justification, and XXX of this thesis in some of its momentous consequences. His train of thought proceeds from the analysis of ‘questions’ in general through distinguishing the possible meanings of these questions, and the purposes for which they can be asked, to various answers to these questions and the detailed dissection of a whole range of concepts, among which the concepts of ‘essence’ and ‘idea’ occupy the main place. The results of this dissection enable the Author to critically oppose epistemological conventionalism and thus strengthen his own position. Therefore, there are various numerous issues that Dr Ingarden considers in his habilitation thesis: its content far transcends the seemingly narrow framework indicated by its title.

V        The manner in which the Author conducts his study proves his undoubted independence. Although he stands, as previously mentioned, on the ground of Husserl’s phenomenology, he proceeds on this ground in his paper with complete freedom, making critical reference to various views expressed by other followers of the phenomenological trend. He does this methodically, carefully forming his arguments step by step into a clearly assembled whole. In dissecting particular issues and formulating particular arguments, the author makes an effort to present his thoughts as convincingly as possible, whereas he is nearly always capable of happily overcoming the difficulties he encounters, thanks to the objective and phenomenological manner of considering them. The reader who does not recognise this method or the phenomenological trend at all notes that the Author, as a supporter of this trend, fails here and there to reckon sufficiently with the possibility of another approach and the resulting risk of allegations against his statements. However, this is an almost inevitable feature of all papers written in the spirit of a certain school, and this one-sidedness, which only truly progressive thinkers can avoid, is somewhat compensated by the paper’s outstanding content and internal consistency, based on a system of concepts and assumptions already created to some degree within the school in question. In any case, Dr Ingarden’s habilitation paper, characterised by thoroughness and scientific diligence, and examining ‘questions’ of a certain kind in some detail for the first time, yields, thanks to the Author’s ingenuity, his quick analyses, and skilful linking of the problems he considers, a great many such results, recognition of which is not dependent on the acceptance of the main trend he professes. It is also clear that Essential Questions is a significant advance in this field of learning and testifies to the independence of the Author’s scientific thinking, and thus entitles Dr Ingarden to participate in the habilitation discussion.

V        Based on the above report on the habilitation thesis of Dr Roman Ingarden submitted by the reviewers selected for this purpose, Professors Dr Kazimierz Twardowski and Dr Mścisław Wartenberg, the Council of the Department of Philosophy resolved at its meeting of 4 June 1924 to admit Dr Ingarden to the habilitation discussion.

V        The habilitation discussion took place at the meeting of the Council of the Department of Philosophy on 25 June 1924; a separate protocol drawn up from this discussion is enclosed herewith. Following the habilitation discussion, the Council of the Department of Philosophy agreed (all votes against one) to consider it sufficient and to allow Dr Ingarden to deliver the habilitation lecture – at the same time, the lecture topic proposed by Dr Ingarden, namely ‘The position of the theory of cognition within the system of philosophical sciences’ was unanimously approved.

V        The habilitation lecture took place on 27 June 1924; following the lecture, the Council of the Department of Philosophy agreed (all votes against two) to grant Dr Roman Witold INGARDEN the right to lecture (venia legendi) in the field of philosophy.

V        This resolution is hereby submitted to the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Education for approval.

Enclosures:

1. Philosophical Rev., XVIII, issues III/IV, pp. 305–311: Badania logiczne Husserla [A study of Husserl’s logic].
2. Philosophical Movement, Year V, no. 3, pp. 45–48: O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym [On clear and unclear philosophical style].
3. Philosophical Movement, Year V, no. 10, pp. 181–184. Sprawozdanie z III. tomu „Jahrbuch für Philosophieund phänomenologische Forschung” [Report on Volume III of Yearbook of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research].
4. Dążenia fenomenologów [The aspirations of phenomenologists]. Offprint from Philosophical Rev., XXII, issues 3 and 4, pp. 118–156 and 315–351.
5. Über die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie [German: On the danger of a petitio principii {Latin: begging the question} in cognition theory]. Offprint from Yearbook of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume V, pp. 545–568.
6. Intuition und Intellekt bei H. Bergson [German: Intuition and intellect according to H. Bergson]. Halle, 1921, pp. 286–461/ Offprint from Yearbook of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume V.
7. Philosophical Movement, Vol. VI nos. 8–10, pp. 116–117. ‘Sprawozdanie z książki: Reinach A. „Gesammelte Schriften” [Report on A. Reinach’s book Collected Writings].
8. ‘Max Scheler’, offprint from Warsaw Review, Year 2, Vol. IV, no. 13, 1922, pp. 5–31.
9. Philosophical Review, Year XXV, issue III, pp. 451–468. ‘Sprawozdanie Dra Chwistka „Wielości rzeczywistości” [Report on Dr Chwistek’s Plurality of Realities].
10. ‘Spór o istotę filozofji’ [The controversy over the essence of philosophy], offprint from Warsaw Review, Year 2, Vol. IV, no. 14, 1922, pp. 161–172.
11. ‘W sprawie „istoty”doświadczenia wewnętrznego”’ [On the issue of the ‘essence’ of internal experience], offprint from Philosophical Rev., Year XXV, issue IV, pp. 512–534.
12. Philosophical Review, Vol. VII, no. 7/8, pp. 99–101. ‘Recenzja z Dra Chwistka „Wielości rzeczywistości”’[Review of Dr Chwistek’s Plurality of Realities].
13. Warsaw Review, Year 3, no. 20, May 1923, pp. 254–257. ‘Sprawozdanie z książki J. Marcinowskiej p.t. ”Wartości twórcze religijnej myśli polskiej”’ [Report on J. Marcinowska’s book entitled Creative Religious Values of Polish Thought].
14. Philosophical Review, Year XXVI, issues I and II, pp. 100–104. ‘Uwagi do „Krótkiej rozprawy i t.d.”’ [Remarks on ‘Short Dissertations etc.’].
15. [On essential questions]. Typed manuscript, 152 folio pages, with the addition of pp. 153–176: ‘W sprawie istnienia przedmiotów idealnych’ [On the issue of the existence of ideal objects].
16. Copy of the report on the habilitation discussion of Dr Roman Ingarden, held at the meeting of the Department of Philosophy of 25 June 1924.
17. Copy of the report on the habilitation lecture, delivered at the meeting of the Department of Philosophy of 27 June 1924.
18. Printed summary of the habilitation dissertation.